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Abstract—Community detection plays a significant role in network analysis. However, it also faces numerous challenges like adversarial
attacks. How to further improve the performance and robustness of community detection for real-world networks has raised great
concerns. In this paper, we propose a concept of adversarial enhancement for community detection, and present two adversarial
enhancement algorithms: one is named adversarial enhancement via genetic algorithm (AE-GA), in which the modularity and the number
of clusters are used to design a fitness function to solve the resolution limit problem; and the other is called adversarial enhancement via
vertex similarity (AE-VS), integrating multiple information of community structures captured by diverse vertex similarities, which scales
well on large-scale networks. The two algorithms are tested along with six existing community detection algorithms on four real-world
networks. Comprehensive experimental results show that, by comparing with two traditional enhancement strategies, our methods help
six community detection algorithms achieve more significant performance improvement. Moreover, experiments on the corresponding
adversarial networks indicate that our methods can rebuild the network structure destroyed by adversarial attacks to certain extent,
achieving stronger defense against community detection deception.
Index Terms—Community detection; Community deception; Adversarial enhancement; Adversarial attack; Genetic algorithm.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R ECENTLY, as an interdiscipline, network science has beenwidely applied to model complex systems in different
fields like sociology, biology, transportation and computer
science [1]–[3]. Real-world networks share various common
properties such as power-law degree distribution [4], [5],
small-world features [6], and community structures [7]. In
particular, community structure is very important in network
analysis. In networks, vertices are organized into groups,
called communities, clusters or modules, with dense connections
within groups and sparse connections between them. For
instance, in co-author networks, communities are formed
by scientists with similar research interests in close fields;
in social networks like Facebook, they can represent people
focusing on similar topics. Many recent researches suggest
that network properties at the community level are quite
different from those at the global level, and thus ignoring
community structure may miss many interesting features [8].
As a matter of fact, identifying communities in networks
has played a significant role in exploiting essential network
structures.
Since Girvan and Newman [7] first proposed a com-
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munity detection method based on edge betweenness, a
large number of techniques have been developed to detect
community structures in networks. Traditional approaches
inlcude spectral clustering [9], [10], hierarchical clustering [7],
statistical inference [11]–[14] and modularity optimization.
Other approaches involve random walk dynamics [15], [16],
cluster synchronization [17], [18], and so on.
However, since these approaches rely on the topological
structure of the underlying network, their capability to
discover the true community structure faces numerous
challenges. The first challenge is about the integrity and
accuracy of the network. Real networks are often incomplete
and suffer from missing edges, since not all real-world
relationships are reflected in a single network. For instance,
users in social networks like Twitter seldom follow all their
friends in activities. Moreover, missing edges also occur
when crawling datasets from online networks with privacy
restrictions. On the other hand, the accuracy of a network is
very likely to be questioned when the information encoded
in the network topology is perturbed by noise, especially
when the network suffers from adversarial attacks, which
leads to the degradation of the performance of many network
analysis methods. In particular, adversarial attacks against
community detection aim to hide target communities or
sensitive edges [19], and finally generate specific adversarial
networks, which can strongly impact the performance of
community detection algorithms. Existing community de-
tection methods rarely consider missing edges and noise in
networks, increasing the risk to obtain wrong community
structures.
Another challenge is the lack of a consensus on the
formal definition of a network community structure [20].
Currently, there are no universal standards for the definition
of community, and a large number of community detection al-
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2gorithms based on different technologies and ideas have been
proposed, which led to a quality discrepancy among different
results. Moreover, modularity optimization has a resolution
limit [21]. Clusters consisting of a number of vertices smaller
than a threshold would not be detected because these clusters
tend to merge into larger ones by modularity optimization.
Large, but local and sparse, communities probably tend to
be divided into smaller ones during community partition.
It is believed that such challenges are mostly from unsta-
ble network structures. Networks with sparse community
structures are vulnerable to adversarial attacks which can
destroy network structures, leading to community detection
deception. Generally, communities with weak structures will
be absorbed from the outside or disintegrated from the
inside of the network. Optimizing the network structure
and improving the stability of the network may be an
effective way to deal with these challenges. A heuristic idea
comes from the fact that community structures show a high
connection density of intra-communities and a sparse one of
inter-communities. Agglomerating the intra-communities by
adding edges between internal vertices and divisiving the
inter-communities by removing edges between communities,
therefore, can strengthen the community structure in a
network. Another idea for enhancing community detection
in original, incomplete or adversarial networks is to enhance
network structure with edge prediction, of which the task
is to complement missing edges or predict future edges
between pairwise vertices based on the current network
structure. The vertex similarity indices can be used to guide
network structure optimization, according to the following
two assumptions: 1) vertices in the same community are
aggregated based on their high similarity; 2) a larger similar-
ity of pairwise vertices leads to a higher likehood of edges
between them [22].
In this paper, we propose a concept of adversarial
enhancement, and develop two adversarial enhancement
algorithms to optimize network structures for community
detection. The main contributions of our work are summa-
rized as follows:
• First, we propose the technique of adversarial en-
hancement to improve the performance of existing
community detection algorithms. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first for enhancing com-
munity detection in both real-world networks and
adversarial networks.
• Second, we develop two adversarial enhancement
algorithms, namely adversarial enhancement via ge-
netic algorithm (AE-GA) based on modularity and
adversarial enhancement via vertex similarity (AE-VS),
and compare them with traditional enhancement
algorithms on four real-world networks. Experimental
results demonstrate the superiority of our methods
in helping six community detection algorithms to
achieve significant improvement of performances.
• Third, we test the four enhancement algorithms on
adversarial networks, the results show that both AE-
GA and AE-VS can rebuild the network structure
destroyed by adversarial attacks and achieve stronger
defense ability against community detection decep-
tion.
• Finally, since our methods are designed to resolve
the resolution limit in modularity optimization, they
can help various community detection algorithms to
achieve consensus, i.e., getting consistent partition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in
Sec. 2, we review the related works on adversarial attacks
for networks and traditional enhancement for community
detection. Then, in Sec. 3, we describe our approaches in
detail. Thereafter, we present extensive experiments in Sec. 4,
with a series of discussions. Finally, we conclude the paper
and outline future work in Sec. 5.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Networks
Related studies about adversarial attacks on networks or
graph data are just at the beginning but raise more and more
concerns. For instance, in a social network, an adversary can
easily disguise himself by adding a very small number of
friendship connections with strangers and deleting connec-
tions with friends, which may have severe consequences.
Before the concept of adversarial attack was introduced,
several studies have focused on destroying the network
structure. Holme et al. [23] investigated the vulnerability
of various networks subject to attacks on vertices or edges,
and found that the network structure changes and several
metrics degrade as important vertices or edges are removed.
Bellingeri et al. [24] found that sequential deletion of vertices
in decreasing order of betweenness centrality was the most
efficient attack strategy when using the size of the largest
connected component (LCC) as network performance index.
Karrer et al. [25] proposed a method for perturbing networks
and a metric of robustness, and then use them to assess the
significance of community structure in various networks.
Adversarial attacks against graph algorithms and models
that applied to link prediction, node classification, or commu-
nity detection are widely studied in recent years. For commu-
nity detection, Waniek et al. [26] proposed a simple heuristic
method deployed by intra-community edge deletion and
inter-community edge addition, and introduced a measure
of concealment to express how well a community is hidden.
Fionda et al. [19] introduced and formalized the community
deception problem, and proposed an community deception
algorithm based on safeness, which achieves a success in
hidding a target community. Chen et al. [27] formulated the
community deception problem and developed an effective
strategy, namely genetic algorithm (GA)-based Q-Attack, to
achieve deception by negligibly rewiring networks.
For other tasks, Yu et al. [28] proposed both heuristic
and evolutionary approaches to hide sensitive links from
being predicted, achieving privacy protection. Dai et al. [29]
proposed a reinforcement learning-based attack approach,
and showed that graph neural network (GNN) models are
vulnerable to such attacks, in both graph-level and node-
level classification tasks. Moreover, Bojchevski et al. [30]
proposed an adversarial attack on network embedding
based on random walks, suggesting that effective adversarial
perturbations can destroy the network structure and lower
the quality of the embeddings. Zugner et al. [31] proposed
an adversarial attack on node classification and modeled
3misclassification by generating imperceptible perturbations
that can confuse the node features and graph structure.
2.2 Traditional Enhancement of Community Detection
Because of the deficiency of many existing community
detection methods, how to improve their performance in
complicated real applications has become an important issue.
Most strategies suggest first preprocessing networks and
then feeding them into community detection algorithms so
as to improve their performances. For instance, it was found
that the resolution limits of modularity optimization can be
alleviated by weighting network edges in different ways,
which make it more suitable for community detection. Meo
et al. [32] introduced a measure of κ-path edge centrality and
proposed a weighting algorithm called WERW-κPath to effec-
tively compute the centrality as edge weight, which is better
for community detection. Sun [33] weighted networks via a
series of edge centrality indices and detected communities in
the weighted network using a function that considers both
links and link weights. Moreover, Lai et al. [34] considered
random walk for simulation on dynamic processes, and ap-
plied it to enhance modularity-based methods, based on the
intuition that pairwise vertices in the same community have
similar dynamic patterns. Interestingly, Li et al. [35] proposed
an edge enhancement approach for motif-aware community
detection, called EdMot, which not only can leverage higher-
order connections of the network, but also can resolve the
hypergraph fragmentation issue. Their method transfers
the network into motif-based hypergraph and partitions
it into modules, and then a new edge set is constructed to
enhance the connectivity structure of the original network
by fully connecting all modules. Lancichinetti et al. [36]
proposed consensus clustering algorithm, which combines
the information of different outputs to obtain a more repre-
sentative partition, to analyze the time evolution of clusters in
dynamics networks. Dahlin et al. [37] proposed the ensemble
cluster that combines the ensemble method with clustering,
and improve community detection by aggregating multiple
runs of algorithms.
On the other hand, model-based methods tend to inte-
grate the enhancement into the whole community detection
procedure. For example, He et al. [38] provided a framework
to enhance the ability of NMF models to detect communities,
which use the NMF method to train a stochastic model
constrained by vertex similarity.
3 THE PROPOSED METHODS
We first formulate the adversarial enhancement problem, and
then present our methods. The notations in this paper are
listed in TABLE 1.
3.1 Problem Formulation
A assume that an undirected and unweighted network is
represented by a graph G = (V, E), which consists of a
vertex set V = {vi | i = 1, . . . , n} and an edge set E =
{ei | i = 1, . . . ,m}. The task of community detection in a net-
work is to find a vertex partitionM = {Mi | i = 1, . . . ,M},
with
⋃Mi = V andMi⋂Mj = ∅ for i 6= j, where setMi
is called a community. The ground-truth community labels of
TABLE 1
Notations used in this paper.
Symbol Description
G The target graph (network)
V, E,M Sets of vertices, edges, communities in graph G
v, e Vertex, edge in graph G
S The studied community detection method
MSG Set of communities found by S in graph G
n,m,M Numbers of vertices, edges, communities in graph G
Mreal The ground-truth community partition in graph G
Emod The adversarial enhancement scheme
Eadd, Edel The schemes of edge addition and edge deletion
G∗ The rewired graph (network)
E∗,M∗ Sets of edges, communities in graph G∗
βa, βd Sample rates of edge addition and deletion
Q Modularity
P Population
F Set of fitness in population P
Ps Size of population
Pc Crossover rate
Pm Mutation rate
Pe Elitist pres rate
Tga Number of iterations
Gco,Aco Co-occurrence graph and its consensus matrix
T Threshold of prune in Gco
GTco Co-occurrence graph pruned with threshold T
MT Community partition in pruned graph GTco
c Consensus of a cluster
C Consensus score of cluster partition
z Number of partitions in AE-VS-E
Acn, . . . ,Arwr Similarity score matrices for graph G
K Number of selected connected components (EdMot).
κ Length of walk path (WERW-κPath)
ρ Iterations of walk (WERW-κPath)
β Attack cost in adversarial attack algorithms
the network is denoted asMreal. Note that the community
overlapping problem will not be considered in this paper.
In the adversarial enhancement scenario, a network will
be rewired, i.e., a series of edges will be modified, which will
be denoted in the following set form:
Emod = {+Eadd,−Edel} , (1)
where Eadd represents the set of edges added to the network
and Edel represents the set of edges removed from the
network, respectively, denoted as:
Eadd = {e˜j | j = 1, . . . , βam; ∀e˜j /∈ E} ,
Edel = {e˜j | j = 1, . . . , βdm; ∀e˜j ∈ E} . (2)
Notably, in Eq. (2), for each enhancement scheme, two
sample rates βa and βa are set to control the quantity of
edge addition and deletion, respectively. Then, based on the
modification scenario Emod, the connectivity structure of the
original network is enhanced to generate a rewired network:
G∗ = (V, E∗) with E∗ = E + Emod. (3)
In this way, we can find the solution Emod to optimize the
network structure by a rewiring process. For the rewired
4networks obtained by adversarial enhancement algorithms,
the community detection methods perform significantly
better and the new partition resultM∗ is closer to the ground-
truth communities, i.e., there is a significant improvement
in evaluation metrics after assigning M∗ to the original
network.
3.2 Modularity-Based Adversarial Enhancement
Adversarial enhancement can be considered as an optimiza-
tion problem. Based on modularity, we propose the first
adversarial enhancement algorithm, namely adversarial en-
hancement via genetic algorithm (AE-GA) based on modularity,
which aims to determine optimal edge modification to rewire
the connections among communities.
3.2.1 Network Rewiring
Previous works [19], [26] have shown that intra-community
edge deletion and inter-community edge addition can effec-
tively deploy community deception attacks. Therefore, by
contrast, edge modification schemes in AE-GA are designed
with two basic operations, i.e., intra-community edge addi-
tion and inter-community edge deletion, which can stabilize
the community structure.
Specifically, for an original network G, the neigh-
bor set of a target vertex vi is denoted as V−i =
{vj | vj 6= vi; (vi, vj) ∈ E}, while its nonneighbor set is de-
noted as V+i = V − V−i − {vi}. Then, a prior community
detection algorithm S is applied to partition G to obtain
a community partition MSG = {Mi | i = 1, . . . , k}. The
candidate set of intra-community edge addition for vi is
denoted as
Eaddi = {(vi, vj) | vj ∈Ml ∩ V+i }, (4)
where Ml is the community that vi belongs to. Similarly,
the candidate set of inter-community edge deletion for vi is
denoted as
Edeli = {(vi, vj) | vj ∈Ml ∩ V−i }, (5)
whereMl = V −Ml.
However, as mentioned above, modularity optimization
suffers from resolution limit that small clusters tend to
merge into larger ones when they have a size smaller than
a specified threshold. We thus consider some adjustments
during network rewiring to deal with this problem. We make
a comparison between the number of communities in the
estimated partition and that in the ground truth:
• If MS > Mreal, extra inter-community addition is
available during adversarial enhancement;
• If MS < Mreal, extra intra-community deletion is
available during adversarial enhancement;
• If MS = Mreal, both the inter-community addition
and intra-community deletion are inoperative.
Here, Mreal is the number of the ground-truth communities
in G and MS is the number of communities found by the
specific community detection method S .
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instance
Fig. 1. The diagram of chromosome in AE-GA. It consists of two parts
including edge addition segment Eadd and edge deletion segment Edel.
The instance of chromosome is initialized in the experiment for Karate
dataset, with an edge addition segment of length 5 and an edge deletion
segment of length 4.
3.2.2 Evolutionary Optimization
We use the genetic algorithm (GA) due to its good per-
formance in solving combination optimization problems.
Specifically, we design the encoding scheme of chromosome
and the function of fitness as follows.
• Chromosome
A chromosome here represents an adversarial en-
hancement scheme Emod, consisting of two parts: Eadd
and Edel, where a gene denotes an edge modification
operation, including edge addition or deletion. The
diagram of chromosome is shown in Fig. 1.
• Fitness
Modularity is commonly used to measure the quality
of community partition for a network with unknown
community structure. The basic idea is to compare
the network with the corresponding null model. Here,
the fitness is defined as
f =
|Q|
e|MS−Mreal|
, (6)
where Q is the modularity of the partition for the
target network. Individuals with larger modularity
and more accurate partition will generally have larger
fitness.
The procedure of AE-GA is shown in Algorithm 1. As
mentioned above, AE-GA requires the prior knowledge of
the community structure, which guides the edge update.
We feed the target network G into community detection
algorithm S to obtain a general community partition MSG
and then construct the candidate edge sets (line 1).
In this scheme, during Initialization, a parental gener-
ation P = {Emodi | i = 1, . . . ,Ps} is randomly generated
with a population size Ps and each individual Emodi in the
population has an unfixed size, i.e., the quantity of modified
edges is not fixed for each initial enhancement scheme (line
2). During selection, the operation is conducted on roulette,
which means that the probability for an individual to be
selected is proportional to its fitness (line 6). Crossover is
the process of combining the parental generation to obatin
new schemes and we apply multi-point crossover to swap
gene segments between two parental chromosomes (line
7). Mutation prevents the algorithm from falling into local
optimization. We traverse each gene in the chromosome
5Algorithm 1: AE-GA
Input: Target network G, community detection
algorithm S , parameter for GA(Ps, Pc, Pm, Pe,
Tga), sample rate βa, βd .
Output: New community partitionM∗
1 MSG ← communityDetection(S,G) ;
2 P,F ← popInitialize(G,MSG ,Ps, βa, βb) ;
3 Initialize current generation i = 0 ;
4 while i < Tga do
5 Pelitist ← retain(F ,P,Pe);
6 Pselect ← selection(F ,P) ;
7 Pcrossover ← crossover(Pselect,Pc) ;
8 Pmutate ← mutation(Pcrossover,Pm,MSG) ;
9 Calculate the fitness of individuals:
F ← getFitness(G,S,Pmutate) ;
10 P ← getNextGeneration(Pmutate,Pelitist)
11 Get the individual with highest fitness from the last
population: Emod ← getBestIndividual(F ,P) ;
12 Rewire the original network to obtain G∗ via Eq. 3 ;
13 Feed G∗ into S to obtain new community partition:
M∗ ← communityDetection(S,G∗). ;
14 end ;
15 returnM∗;
and conduct the mutation operation with a mutation rate
Pm (line 8). In so doing, we randomly replace the edge
modification operation e˜add or e˜del with another one. Finally,
elitist preservation is applied to retain excellent individuals,
which refers to enhancement schemes with higher fitness. In
particular, we retain excellent individuals by replacing the
worst 20% of the offspring with the best 20% of the parents
(line 5). Evolution is a process of iteration and we set the
number of iterations Tga as the evolutionary generation. The
evolutionary optimization stops when it is convergent or this
condition is satisfied.
3.3 Similarity-Based Adversarial Enhancement
Empirically, vertices in the same community can be ag-
gregated due to their high similarity. Therefore, we adopt
the similarity indices to aggregate those vertices of high
similarity, i.e., considering the similarity indices as the
guidance of edge modification. Based on this, we propose
another adversarial enhancement algorithm, namely adver-
sarial enhancement via vertex similarity (AE-VS), which rewires
a network via multiple similarity indices and aggregates
corresponding community partitions to generate a more
accurate community structure. The framework of AE-VS is
shown in Fig. 2, and the procedure of AE-VS is shown in
Algorithm 2.
3.3.1 Network Rewiring
Vertex similarity can be defined as the number of common
features that a pair of vertices share [39]. Zhou et al. [40]
compared ten local similarity indices on six real networks
and found that Resource Allocation (RA) index has the best
overall performance. Other similarity indices based on paths
or random walks are summarized and compared in [41].
Here, we adopt a variety of similarity indices, as shown in
Community Detection
Similarity Rewiring
Partition Aggregation
Network Pruning
Community Structure
Fig. 2. The framework of AE-VS.
Algorithm 2: AE-VS
Input: Target network G, community detection
algorithm S , sample rate βa.
Output: New community structure M∗
1 Compute similarity matrices for indices in TABLE 2:
{Acn, . . . ,Arwr} ← computeSimilarity(G) ;
2 Obtain enhancement schemes via sampling:
{E1mod, . . . , Ezmod} ← sample(βa, {Acn, . . . ,Arwr}) ;
3 Update graph via network rewiring :
{G∗1 , . . . ,G∗z} ← rewire(G, {E1mod, . . . , Ezmod});
4 Obtain multiple partitions via community detection:
{M∗1, . . . ,M∗z} ←
communityDetection(S, {G∗1 , . . . ,G∗z}) ;
5 Get a co-occurrence network from multiple partitions:
Gco,Aco ← getCoNetwork({M∗1, . . . ,M∗z}) ;
6 Find an optimal pruning threshold and core
communities:
T ,MTcore ← getOptimalThreshold(Gco, z) ;
7 Get the final partition by assigning isolated vertices to
core communities:
M∗ ← getFinalPartition(MTcore, {Acn, . . . ,Arwr}) ;
8 end ;
9 returnM∗;
TABLE 2
Similarity indices used in AE-VS.
Category Similarity index
Local CN, Jaccard [42], Salton [43], HPI [44], AA [45], RA [40]
Path LP [46]
Random walk RWR [47]
TABLE 2, to guide enhancement strategy. It is worth noting
that many other similarity indices can also be applied into
this scheme.
During network rewiring, we calculate the similarity
matrix for each index, which consists of similarity scores of
arbitrary pairwise vertices (line 1). Enhancement schemes are
operated by sampling nonexistent edges from the candidate
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Fig. 3. Visualization of network pruning in the co-occurrence network of Karate network. The last four represent the co-occurrence network pruned
with various values of threshold T . Note that vertices with the same color share the same ground truth community label.
set {(ei, ej)| i 6= j; (ei, ej) /∈ E)} with a sample rate βa, and
the probability for an edge to be selected is proportional to
its similarity score (line 2). Note that we only consider edge
addition in AE-VS. We update the target network G using
the enhancement schemes and feed these rewired networks
into the community detection algorithm to obtain a series of
community partitions (lines 3, 4).
3.3.2 Partition Ensemble
Due to the diversity of similarity indices and enhancement
schemes, these partitions are likely to be non-unique and not
necessarily better than the original partitionM. Ensemble
learning, which achieves better classification and prediction
performance by integrating multiple weak models, has been
used for clustering tasks. Previous studied consensus and
ensemble clustering [36], [37] , showing that these techniques
can be combined with existing clustering methods and
enhance the stability and accuracy of community partitions.
We aggregate multiple partitions using a consensus
matrix Aco = (aij)n×n, in which element aij indicates the
frequency of two vertices i and j assigned to the same
community. A weighted co-occurrence graph Gco can be gen-
erated from the consensus matrix Aco (line 5). Once pairwise
vertices appear in the same community in some partitions,
Gco links them and assigns weights that correspond to the
frequency of co-occurrence. A larger/smaller weight means
a higher/lower likelihood that the pairwise vertices belong
to the same community. In other words, edges with larger
weights tend to be intra-community edges while those with
lower weights can be considered as inter-community edges.
Since the co-occurrence network Gco is constructed from all
partitions, we have no access to deploy intra-community
edge addition without new partitions, but we can prune
Gco to remove inter-community edges by setting a threshold
T . During pruning, all edges with weights less than T are
considered as inter-community edges and will be removed
from Gco.
A visualization of network pruning in the co-occurrence
network of Karate network is shown in Fig. 3. In this paper,
we use eight similarity indices, and for each index, ten sam-
ples are performed, to generate a total of eighty partitions,
which determine the domain of threshold T ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 80}.
The original Karate network is shown in Fig. 3 (a). There are
two communities in Karate network, with the vertices of the
same color sharing the same ground-truth community label.
Fig. 3 (b) shows the co-occurrence network, which aggregates
the information of 80 partitions and has dense connections.
The last three subgraphs show the different pruned co-
occurrence networks with various thresholds. When T = 20,
the pruned co-occurrence network still has only one con-
nected component but two bridge vertices emerge, as shown
in Fig. 3 (c). With the increase of the threshold, Gco is divided
into two connected components, matching exactly with the
two clusters in the original network, as shown in Fig. 3 (d).
When the threshold approaches the upper limit, generally,
we’ll get several small connected components that contain
few vertices, or even isolated vertices, as shown in Fig. 3 (e).
This phenomenon indicates that the selection of threshold
actually influences the result of partition.
In order to address the resolution limit problem, we
optimize the threshold via a traversal procedure (line 6).
The domain of threshold is {1, 2, . . . z}, i.e., T will always
be smaller than the number of partitions z. We prune Gco
with a threshold T to yield a pruned network GTco, and
evaluate the cluster partition of GTco using cluster consensus
metric, which can quantify the stability of clusters [48]. For
a pruned co-occurrence network GTco with cluster partition
MT = {Mk | k = 1, . . . ,MT }, the consensus of clusterMk
is defined as
c(Mk) = 1
Mk (Mk − 1) /2
∑
i,j∈Mk
i<j
Aco(i, j), (7)
where Mk is the size of Mk. The optimal threshold cor-
responds to the maximum partition score, which can be
computed via a weighted sum of cluster consensus, as
follows:
C(MT ) =
MT∑
k=1
Mk
n
c(Mk), (8)
T = argmax
T
C(MT ). (9)
After pruning, the co-occurrence network is split into
several connected components, and those with large sizes
will be treated as core communitiesMTcore. Generally, we’ll
get several small connected components that contain few ver-
tices, or even isolated vertices, when pruning network with
a relatively large threshold. In order to get a final partition,
these vertices in small connected components will be treated
as isolated ones and assigned to the core community with
7which it has the maximum average similarity score (line 7).
The ID of a core community can be obtained by computing
argmax
k
1
8Mkcore
∑
j∈Mkcore
∑
{Acn(i, j), . . . ,Arwr(i, j)},
(10)
where Mkcore is the size ofMkcore which is a core community
inMTcore. Note that it is divided by 8, since here we use eight
similarity indices in AE-VS.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Datasets
We use four real-world networks to evaluate the effectiveness
of our adversarial enhancement algorithms. For all datasets,
the edges are treated as undirected and the ground-truth
community labels are provided. TABLE 3 gives an overview
of the networks, including the number of communities
detected by each test method.
• Zachary Karate club (Karate) [49]. The network is
about the pattern of relationship among the members
of a Karate club at an American university, which
splits into two groups after a dispute.
• Books about US politics (Polbooks) [50]. It is a
network of books about US politics published in
2004 for presidential election. Links between books
represent their frequent purchasing by the same
buyers.
• American College football (Football) [7]. The net-
work is about the schedule of games between Ameri-
can college football teams in regular season Fall 2000.
• Political blogs (Polblogs) [51]. The network con-
sists of hyperlinks between weblogs on US politics
recorded in 2005.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Benefit from the availablilty of the ground-truth community
labels, we evaluate the community partitions using super-
vised metrics like normalized nutual information [52] and
adjusted rand index. Note that we design the fitness in AE-
GA using modularity Q, thus it is not suitable to use it as
the evaluation metric. The two evaluation metrics are briefly
introduced in the following.
• Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) [52]. NMI is
a commonly used criterion to evaluate the similarity
of two clustering results. It quantifies how much
information the estimated partition contains in the
real partition. For two clusters X and Y , the NMI is
defined as:
I norm (X,Y ) =
2I(X,Y )
H(X) +H(Y )
, (11)
where I(X,Y ) = H(Y ) − H(X|Y ) is the mutual
information of X and Y , H(Y ) is the Shannon
entropy of Y , and H(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy
of X given Y .
• Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [53]. ARI is the corrected-
for-chance version of the Rand index, which measures
TABLE 3
Real-world networks. Mreal is the number of ground-truth communities
in G and MSG is the number of communities found by the specific
community detection method S.
Network V E Mreal
MSG
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM
Karate 34 78 2 3 3 4 4 2 2
Polbooks 105 441 3 6 4 5 4 4 3
Football 115 613 12 12 6 10 10 9 12
Polblogs 1490 19090 2 306 277 416 276 272 2
the degree of agreement between an estimated parti-
tion and a real partition. It is defined as
ARI =
RI − E[RI]
max(RI)− E[RI] . (12)
Both NMI and ARI require the ground-truth community
labels for evaluation purpose and the values are in the range
between 0 to 1. Note that ARI can yield negative values if the
index is less than the expected index [53]. For both metrics, a
larger value indicates a better partition.
4.3 Community Detection Methods
We consider the following six community detection algo-
rithms in our experiments. The first five are available in the
Python version of the igraph 1 library. The implement of
Node2vec is available online 2.
• Infomap (INF) [54]. Infomap decomposes a network
into modules by compressing the description of
the information flow, i.e., it detects communities by
minimizing the encoding length for a random walk.
• Fast Greedy (FG) [55]. This is a down-top hierarchical
agglomeration algorithm. It merges individual ver-
tices into communities based on a greedy modularity
maximization strategy.
• WalkTrap (WT) [15]. It detects communities based on
the idea that short random walks tend to stay in the
same community.
• Louvain (LOU) [56]. This is a multi-level modularity
optimization algorithm. It initializes each vertex with
a separate community, and moves vertices between
communities iteratively in a way that maximizes the
vertices’ local contributions to the overall modularity
score.
• Label Propagation (LP) [57]. This method detects
communities by initializing each vertex with a unique
label and re-assigning each vertex the dominant label
in its neighbourhood in each iteration.
• Node2vec + Kmeans (N2V KM) [58]. This is a
network embedding method, which learns lower-
dimensional representations for vertices by biased ran-
dom walk and skip-Gram. The K-means algorithm
is then used to detect communities by clustering the
embedded vectors of vertices in an Euclidean space.
We take the number of clustering K in K-means the same
as the ground truth. Then, we obtain the same number of
communities as the ground truth after feeding the network
into N2V KM according to TABLE 3.
1. https://igraph.org/python/
2. https://github.com/eliorc/node2vec
84.4 Adversarial Attack Methods
In order to test the defense capability of our enhancement
algorithms against adversarial attacks, we also generate a
series of adversarial graphs from each dataset by using the
following two adversarial attack methods.
• Q-Attack [27]. It is an evolutionary attack strategy
based on genetic algorithm, in which the modularity
is used to design the fitness function. This strategy
deploys attack via negligible network rewiring, which
doesn’t change the degree of vertices, and achieves
the state-of-the-art attack effect.
• Dm-Deception via Modularity [19]. Dm is a commu-
nity deception algorithm based on modularity, which
can hide a target community via intra-community
edge deletion and inter-community edge addition.
4.5 Baseline Enhancement Methods
We compare our adversarial enhancement algorithms with
the following two baseline methods.
• EdMot [35]. It is an edge enhancement approach
for motif-aware community detection via network
rewiring and is proposed to address the hypergraph
fragmentation issue.
• WERW-Kpath [32]. It is an enhancement approach
for community detection via network weighting. It
exploits random walks to compute the κ-path edge
centrality, which is then used to weight the edges.
4.6 Experiment Setup
For all datasets, edges in graphs are treated as undirected and
self-loops will be removed. The parameter settings for the
proposed algorithms and baselines are shown in TABLE 4.
In AE-GA, the general parameters of GA are set as
empirical values, and the proportion of elitist preservation
Pe is set to 20%. Note that sample rate controls the upper
limit of the chromosome size during Initialization, i.e., each
chromosome will be initialized with an unfixed size not
larger than (βa + βb)m. The sample rate of edge addition βa
is fixed to 3.0 for all experiments while the sample rate of
edge deletion βd is unfixed (0 for original networks and 0.2
for adversarial networks). For AE-VS, the selection of sample
rate varies across datasets, and we will study in Sec. 4.7.2
the impact of the sample rate on the performance of AE-VS.
Specifically, the sample rate βa is set to 1.5, 2.7, 0.2 and 2.7
for Karate, Polbooks, Football and Polblogs, respectively.
For the community detection algorithm N2V KM, we use
the default setting for parameters in node2vec. Specifically,
the walk length is 80, the number of walks per node is 10,
the embedding dimension is 128, and both return hyper
parameter p and in-out parameter q are equal to 1. The
number of ground-truth communities is set as the input to
K-means. Moreover, because of the randomness of LP and
N2V KM, we repeat experiments for 20 times and report the
average results of community detection.
We generate adversarial networks for the two smaller
datasets, Karate and Polbooks, via Q-Attack, and use Dm to
attack the other two larger datasets. Details of the adversarial
networks are shown in TABLE 5.
TABLE 4
Parameters setting for the proposed algorithms and baselines.
Method Parameter Original Adversarial
AE-GA
βa 3.0 3.0
βb 0.0 0.2
Ps 120
Pc 0.8
Pm 0.02
Pe 0.2
Tga 1000
AE-VS βa (1.5, 2.7, 0.2, 2.7)
EdMot K 1
WERW-κPath κ 0.1m ∼ 0.5m
ρ 400 ∼ 2000
TABLE 5
Details of adversarial networks.
Adversarial network Attack method Parameter
S β
Adv(Karate) Q-Attack INF 10
Adv(Polbooks) Q-Attack LOU 40
Adv(Football) Dm WT 100
Adv(Polbolgs) Dm LOU 5
4.7 Experiment Results
In order to verify the effectiveness of the adversarial en-
hancement on both the original networks and the networks
under adversarial attacks, we respectively use the above-
mentioned four methods, including AE-GA, AE-VS, EdMot
and WERW-κPath, to show a crosswise comparison, with
results reported in TABLE 6 , TABLE 7 and Fig. 5, where the
scores are averaged over 20 runs for each method.
4.7.1 Adversarial Enhancement in Original Networks
TABLE 6 reports the results of adversarial enhancement
for six community detection algorithms on four original
networks. The results are expressed as the estimated values,
where the average relative improvement rate (IMP) of
metrices is also provided. For each column, we highlight
the best result in bold. Based on the results, we have the
following findings.
1) Our methods significantly outperform baselines on
all original networks in most cases, i.e., both AE-GA
and AE-VS achieve significant enhancement effect
on six community detection algorithms, indicating
stronger generalization and transferability.
2) By comparison, AE-VS not only has better perfor-
mance, but also has lower time complexity and better
interpretability than AE-GA.
3) For each dataset, those community detection algo-
rithms of different performances on the original
networks usually obtain more similar community
structures during enhancement. Specifically, the stan-
dard deviations of the original values of NMI on the
9TABLE 6
The results of four enhancement methods on four original networks. For each community detection method, the best result is highlighted in bold.
Karate
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP
Original 0.711 0.707 0.724 0.618 0.632 0.820 0.00% 0.702 0.680 0.541 0.462 0.599 0.857 0.00%
EdMot 0.630 0.837 0.631 0.630 0.723 0.837 2.10% 0.513 0.882 0.513 0.517 0.693 0.882 4.67%
WERW-κPath 0.838 0.740 0.698 0.724 0.748 0.806 8.79% 0.803 0.600 0.504 0.541 0.686 0.849 4.40%
AE-GA 0.831 0.837 0.838 0.838 0.582 0.755 11.78% 0.873 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.587 0.788 32.99%
AE-VS 0.838 1.000 0.839 1.000 0.801 0.836 27.65% 0.803 1.000 0.802 1.000 0.723 0.882 41.63%
Polbooks
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP
Original 0.503 0.531 0.563 0.516 0.552 0.537 0.00% 0.536 0.638 0.681 0.558 0.639 0.644 0.00%
EdMot 0.508 0.574 0.521 0.513 0.559 0.553 0.85% 0.567 0.675 0.612 0.549 0.655 0.661 0.81%
WERW-κPath 0.515 0.559 0.589 0.537 0.556 0.541 2.99% 0.531 0.671 0.699 0.600 0.617 0.648 1.92%
AE-GA 0.554 0.554 0.554 0.553 0.555 0.555 4.00% 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.652 0.642 0.655 6.41%
AE-VS 0.610 0.565 0.589 0.559 0.607 0.578 9.71% 0.709 0.663 0.690 0.674 0.665 0.668 11.02%
Football
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP
Original 0.924 0.708 0.888 0.891 0.877 0.926 0.00% 0.897 0.474 0.815 0.807 0.756 0.892 0.00%
EdMot 0.924 0.713 0.855 0.834 0.891 0.925 -1.33% 0.897 0.442 0.713 0.626 0.774 0.903 -6.35%
WERW-κPath 0.924 0.777 0.907 0.859 0.943 0.926 2.63% 0.897 0.577 0.855 0.722 0.938 0.892 6.72%
AE-GA 0.927 0.855 0.927 0.916 0.873 0.925 4.61% 0.890 0.709 0.889 0.864 0.737 0.890 10.36%
AE-VS 0.926 0.886 0.922 0.924 0.913 0.927 6.17% 0.890 0.794 0.892 0.881 0.860 0.890 16.48%
Polblogs
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V KM IMP
Original 0.407 0.443 0.401 0.442 0.457 0.341 0.00% 0.441 0.528 0.419 0.521 0.551 0.289 0.00%
EdMot 0.428 0.447 0.405 0.449 0.463 0.361 2.65% 0.459 0.536 0.401 0.539 0.556 0.307 1.95%
WERW-κPath 0.406 0.442 0.401 0.439 0.452 0.331 -0.84% 0.443 0.527 0.418 0.522 0.543 0.282 -0.62%
AE-GA 0.453 0.525 0.504 0.529 0.519 0.381 16.81% 0.472 0.618 0.599 0.622 0.616 0.357 20.35%
AE-VS 0.506 0.536 0.518 0.527 0.519 0.452 23.26% 0.614 0.633 0.612 0.629 0.618 0.468 33.37%
four datasets are (0.073, 0.022, 0.081, 0.042), while
those of the corresponding estimated values are
(0.16, 0.021, 0.016, 0.030). These may indicate that our
methods can make the network structure more stable
and achieve consensus partition. Moreover, AE-VS
achieves perfect enhancement on some community
detection algorithms applied to small datasets. For
instance, when enhancing FG and LOU via AE-VS
on Karate dataset, both NMI and ARI are equal
to 1, suggesting that FG and LOU algorithms can
detect community structures completely correctly
after enhancement. This also illustrates the increase
of standard deviation for Karate network.
4.7.2 Impact of Sample Rate in AE-VS
Due to the outstanding performance of AE-VS, we fur-
ther investigate the impact of the sample rate βa on the
enhancement results, as visualized in Fig. 4. Such impact
behaves differently on different networks. According to
TABLE 6, we can get a sorting based on the average
NMI and ARI, i.e., Polblogs < Polbooks < Karate <
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Fig. 4. The impact of sample rate βa on the performance of AE-VS. The
dotted lines of the same color mark the performances obtained by the
corresponding community detection algorithm in original networks.
Football. Specifically, Polblogs has a low average NMI
equal to 0.415, and the performance of AE-VS is improved
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TABLE 7
The results of four enhancement methods on four adversarial networks. For each community detection method, the best result is highlighted in bold.
Karate
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP
Original 0.711 0.707 0.724 0.618 0.632 0.820 33.04% 0.702 0.68 0.541 0.462 0.599 0.857 56.20%
Adv 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.547 0.671 0.00% 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.445 0.694 0.00%
EdMot 0.487 0.474 0.470 0.487 0.468 0.589 -6.03% 0.330 0.376 0.353 0.330 0.430 0.684 1.79%
WERW-κPath 0.500 0.496 0.480 0.431 0.545 0.580 -4.23% 0.345 0.354 0.313 0.308 0.388 0.572 -7.28%
AE-GA 0.688 0.821 0.837 0.666 0.653 0.656 36.48% 0.715 0.871 0.882 0.655 0.627 0.674 79.91%
AE-VS 0.727 0.837 0.806 0.837 0.837 0.837 54.17% 0.563 0.882 0.849 0.882 0.882 0.882 100.89%
Polbooks
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP
Original 0.503 0.531 0.563 0.516 0.552 0.537 24.16% 0.536 0.638 0.681 0.558 0.639 0.644 33.19%
Adv 0.418 0.502 0.393 0.343 0.461 0.462 0.00% 0.459 0.598 0.351 0.252 0.534 0.581 0.00%
EdMot 0.501 0.607 0.501 0.454 0.566 0.515 21.91% 0.559 0.667 0.555 0.461 0.642 0.625 26.45%
WERW-κPath 0.395 0.392 0.378 0.445 0.440 0.488 -1.59% 0.423 0.467 0.431 0.485 0.515 0.574 4.32%
AE-GA 0.531 0.530 0.531 0.531 0.511 0.528 22.61% 0.634 0.632 0.634 0.634 0.603 0.626 35.60%
AE-VS 0.541 0.538 0.564 0.538 0.521 0.538 25.63% 0.621 0.634 0.621 0.664 0.635 0.618 36.68%
Football
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP
Original 0.924 0.708 0.888 0.891 0.877 0.926 7.91% 0.897 0.474 0.815 0.807 0.756 0.892 36.86%
Adv 0.814 0.659 0.793 0.850 0.798 0.918 0.00% 0.498 0.364 0.481 0.696 0.476 0.876 0.00%
EdMot 0.814 0.642 0.844 0.816 0.758 0.921 -0.77% 0.498 0.334 0.634 0.618 0.365 0.886 -1.65%
WERW-κPath 0.814 0.696 0.883 0.843 0.835 0.913 3.15% 0.498 0.431 0.768 0.661 0.685 0.876 15.57%
AE-GA 0.924 0.776 0.924 0.907 0.856 0.924 9.91% 0.897 0.570 0.897 0.831 0.531 0.897 36.33%
AE-VS 0.814 0.830 0.924 0.904 0.888 0.909 9.04% 0.498 0.646 0.897 0.843 0.777 0.847 32.94%
Polblogs
NMI ARI
INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP INF FG WT LOU LP N2V M IMP
Original 0.407 0.443 0.401 0.442 0.457 0.341 21.51% 0.441 0.528 0.419 0.521 0.551 0.289 20.15%
Adv 0.340 0.372 0.336 0.361 0.378 0.263 0.00% 0.376 0.461 0.343 0.445 0.459 0.204 0.00%
EdMot 0.355 0.368 0.345 0.379 0.388 0.287 3.51% 0.421 0.463 0.338 0.480 0.459 0.241 4.98%
WERW-κPath 0.333 0.387 0.347 0.383 0.400 0.249 2.39% 0.378 0.450 0.363 0.445 0.494 0.203 1.97%
AE-GA 0.473 0.527 0.428 0.532 0.530 0.377 39.85% 0.535 0.620 0.599 0.625 0.625 0.345 46.37%
AE-VS 0.504 0.537 0.520 0.529 0.518 0.448 49.07% 0.610 0.633 0.614 0.631 0.617 0.459 55.77%
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Fig. 5. The community detection performance of various algorithms before and after enhancement for the adversarial networks. Here, it includes the
community detection results on the original networks, used as a reference.
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with the increase of sample rate; Polbooks has an average
NMI equal to 0.534, and its performance curve is messy but
basically goes up. For Karate with the average NMI equal to
0.702, five of the six community detection algorithms have
relatively stable performances while Infomap suffers from
negative enhancement with a relatively large sample rate;
Football has an average NMI up to 0.869, the performance of
AE-VS drops steadily with the increase of sample rate.
As we can see, in general, the impact of sample rate on the
performance of AE-VS is influenced by the network structure.
That is, for networks with weak community structures
and low average performance metrics, like Polblogs, most
community detection algorithms have huge spaces to be
enhanced, i.e., the performance of AE-VS is significantly
improved with the increase of sample rate. But, for those
networks with strong community structures like Football, it
is difficult for AE-VS to further enhance the community
detection, i.e., adding or deleting more links may even
weaken the stable community structure, leading to the
degradation of performance.
4.7.3 Adversarial Enhancement in Adversarial Networks
In graph data mining, adversarial attack aims to degrade the
performance of algorithms by perturbing the graph structure
or attacking the computational process. In social networks,
the adversarial attack on community detection or link
prediction probably facilitates to hide the real community
structure or sensitive links. In order to address the defensive
capability of our adversarial enhancement algorithms against
such adversarial attacks, we also design experiments on
adversarial networks obtained by slightly modifying the
original networks via certain adversarial attacks.
The performance of the four enhancement algorithms on a
series of adversarial networks is presented in TABLE 7, which
is also visualized in Fig. 5 for a more intuitive perspective.
Note that here we include the community detection results
on the original networks and the adversarial networks as
references. We can see that, first, the performance metrics,
both NMI and ARI, are significantly smaller in the adversarial
networks than those in the original networks, indicating
that an adversarial attack has indeed broken the network
structure and achieved a community detection deception.
Then, during adversarial enhancement, again, our adver-
sarial enhancement algorithms significantly outperform the
baselines on all adversarial networks in most cases. In fact,
both AE-GA and AE-VS help the six community detection
algorithms achieve huge improvements on detection perfor-
mances, which is even better than the results on the original
networks. However, the baselines EdMot and WERW-κ-Path
have mediocre performance and may fail with the increase of
the attack strength. Such results indicate that our adversarial
enhancement algorithms could help partially or even fully
recover the network structures destroyed by adversarial
attacks, validating their strong defensive capacity.
4.7.4 Visualization of AE-GA on Karate Network
As a case study, we visualize the adversarial enhancement (by
AE-GA3) for algorithm LOU on Karate network, as shown in
Fig. 6.
3. We choose AE-GA rather than AE-VS, since the latter integrates a
number of results and thus is relatively difficult to be visualized.
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Fig. 6. Adversarial enhancement for LOU on Karate network.
The community structure found by LOU for the original
network is shown in Fig. 6 (a), where there are four commu-
nities. Since the number of communities found by LOU is
more than the ground truth (Mreal = 2), as mentioned in
Sec. 3.2.1, extra inter-community edge addition is available
when MS > Mreal (S = LOU). The result of adversarial
enhancement on the original network is shown in Fig. 6
(b). This adversarial enhancement scheme consists of one
intra-community edge addition and 13 inter-community
edge additions, and achieves a significant improvement
in community detection, leading to the increase of 35.56%
and 91.02% in NMI and ARI, respectively. Specifically, a
large number of inter-community edge additions successfully
merge small clusters into larger ones, resulting in more
accuracy partitions.
Notably, the decrease of modularity here (from 0.4188
to 0.3718) can explain why did not design modularity as
fitness function directly. By comparing the information
in Figs. 6 (a) and (b), a community partition with larger
modularity does not mean closer to the ground-truth com-
munity structure. Therefore, in the situations where we know
the number of communities in advance, we can combine
modularity with the true number of clusters, to obtain
more accurate optimization guidance. This has been shown
to have excellent performance in enhancing community
detection. However, when facing unlabeled networks, the
fitness function degrades to modularity, i.e., f = Q, so the
enhancement may be weakened to a certain extent.
Now, consider the adversarial network obtain by Q-
Attack, as shown in Fig. 6 (c). Q-Attack keeps the number of
edges unchanged during community deception and achieves
a 22.85% reduction in modularity with an attack cost of 17.
As we can see, community structure suffers from structural
damage and a new cluster that contains the fringe vertices
in the original network is discovered. We then deploy adver-
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TABLE 8
The average running time of the four enhancement algorithms. The test
is performed on LOU with the same experimental setup.
Method
Dataset
Karate Polbooks Football Polblogs
EdMot 0.31 1.42 1.73 75.11
WERW-κPath 10.36 121.54 333.49 13203.22
AE-GA 278.40 838.87 2318.16 259200.00
AE-VS 0.51 1.96 2.62 88.36
sarial enhancement with the same setup to this adversarial
network and obtain the enhanced network shown in Fig. 6 (d).
Compared with the community partition in Fig. 6 (c), LOU
achieves a better partition, which even surpasses that in the
original network shown in Fig. 6 (a). Such result suggests that
our adversarial enhancement can indeed help the existing
community detection algorithms defend against adversarial
attacks. More interestingly, it seems that such adversarial
enhancement not only repairs the broken network structure
caused by adversarial attack, but also further optimizes it to
obtain a clearer community structure.
4.7.5 Computational Complexity Analysis
In order to compare the efficiency of our two adversarial
enhancement algorithms and to see how fast they are, we
roughly estimated their time complexity as follows.
• AE-GA runs in time O(Ps · Tga · |S|), where |S| is
the time complexity of the community detection al-
gorithm to be enhanced. For evolutionary algorithms,
a fitness function is used to evaluate the quality of
the results during iteration, which directly affects
the optimization effeciency and convergence speeds
of the algorithms. In AE-GA, the fitness function
is computed by modularity Q and the number of
communities MS , obtained from the community
structure, which leads to an additional community
detection before the calculation of fitness.
• AE-VS runs in time O(m · βa+ |S|+ |VS|). Note that
O(|VS|) is the maximum time complexity among
selected similarity metrics. The weighted random
sampling without replacement has a time complexity
of |E| · βa. During the process of partition ensemble,
which runs in time O(n2), the selection of a threshold
has a cost of O(|Eco|), where Eco is the edge set of
the co-occurrence network, for which the maximum
possible number of edges is n(n− 1)/2.
Moreover, we evaluate the efficiency of our algorithms by
directly comparing the running time with baselines. The
average running time (in seconds) of the four algorithms are
presented in TABLE 8. As we can see, although the algorithm
AE-GA performs well on small networks, it is limited by
the optimization mode and does not scale well on large
networks. Instead, AE-VS has a comparable time complexity
with EdMot but scales well on large networks.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed adversarial enhancement to
improve the performance of existing community detection
algorithms. In particular, we put forward two adversarial
enhancement algorithms, namely AE-GA and AE-VS, taking
both defensive effect and transferability into account. Ex-
tensive experimental results demonstrate the superiority of
our methods in helping six common community detection
algorithms achieve significant performance improvements
for both real-world networks and adversarial networks.
Moreover, we designed a fitness function with the number
of clusters in AE-GA and the process of threshold selection
in AE-VS, which can help the existing community detection
algorithms solve the resolution limit in modularity optimiza-
tion and achieve consensus partitions. Although there is a
restriction of time complexity in AE-GA, AE-VS is effective
and scales well on large networks.
Finally, our findings inspire more ideas for future works.
For instance, the current selected community detection
algorithms mainly focus on nonoverlapping community
detection, therefore extending adversarial enhancement to
overlapping case for community detection, could be interest-
ing topics for further studies.
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